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ATTACKING THE COPYRIGHT EVILDOERS
IN CYBERSPACE
Cynthia M. Ho*
INTRODUCTIONEVILDOERS are responsible for the rhetorical collision in cyber-
space between copyright owners and users.' Evildoers are singled
out for threatening the existence of the Internet, either by sup-
pressing free speech or by usurping the technology for freewheeling copy-
ing. Although typically the term "evildoers" is not used explicitly to
identify the actors involved, the concept is implicit in each of these accu-
sations. Accusing evildoers for the adversarial nature of copyright poli-
cymaking may at first glance appear to be an overly simplistic
characterization that minimizes the actual conflict between owners and
users of copyrighted works. However, the term evildoers also captures
the essence of the problem currently underlying debates concerning copy-
right law; all interested parties suggest that there is a sinister force at
work, although the specific accusations are obviously more varied and
sometimes contradictory.
In the context of copyrights on the Internet, different evildoers are
identified, depending on who is asked to identify the evildoers. For ex-
ample, to most consumers, the evildoers in cyberspace are the copyright
owners that have stripped the Internet of its freewheeling nature by re-
moving things such as the file-sharing tool Napster.2 On the other hand,
major copyright owners vilify consumers-and those who assist them-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author
would like to thank Professors Graeme Dinwoodie, Christian Johnson, Susan Kuo, Mark
Lemley, Patrick McFadden, and Neil Williams for their comments on prior drafts of this
essay. In addition, the author thanks Heather Nolan and Julie Fitzgibbons for their able
research assistance. All errors are, of course, my own. Any comments or questions are
welcome at cho@luc.edu.
1. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (applying the
term "evildoers" to the un-identified terrorists responsible for the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks on the World Trade Center) [hereinafter State of the Union].
2. See, e.g., Larry Katz, Yearn to Burn? It Won't Ail CD Sales, BOSTON HERALD,
May 31, 2002, at S21 (characterizing the file-sharing controversy as a "smokescreen for
record company greed"); Patrick Goldstein, A Music Lesson on Piracy for Hollywood,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at 6(1) (noting the portrayal of the music industry as "the
personification of soulless corporate greed"). Moreover, the music industry as a whole
could be construed as an "axis of evil" to consumers since there seems to be an evil con-
spiracy to prevent consumers from engaging in activities in which they feel entitlement.
See, State of the Union, supra note 1. For example, new CDs and electronics are being
configured to prevent CD burning, even if only for personal use. On the other hand, from
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for making copies of copyrighted material with little regard for whether
the consumers own original copies. 3 The identification of evildoers im-
plicitly discounts the possibility that parties merely possess differing, but
reasonable views. Rather, the current polarized vision of evildoers has
created a situation in which consumers are immune to allegations of cop-
yright piracy and content owners rush to create new methods-whether
legal or technological-to halt consumer copying.
This essay moves beyond the name-calling to expose important myths
that underlie competing concerns about copyrights on the Internet. In
particular, this essay suggests that much of the current clash between con-
sumers and copyright owners can be attributed to the existence of power-
ful and persistent myths about copyright law that have continued vitality
in the Internet world. The interplay between reality and these powerful
copyright myths remains an important, yet unexplored area. This essay
begins to bridge the current divide between major content owners and
copyright users, such as most consumers, 4 and by directly tackling the
underlying myths. In so doing, this essay hopes to help pave the way
towards a world where evil is eliminated from discussions concerning
copyright issues on the Internet.
This essay is organized principally around three major myths that im-
pact the operation of copyrights on the Internet. Part I explores the myth
that everything on the Internet is free from copyright restrictions. Part II
discusses the myth that copyrights need not be respected because they are
primarily owned by greedy content-owners who have failed to adequately
serve consumers, such that consumers are entitled to engage in a type of
vigilante redistributive justice. Part III explains the important myth that
consumer copying does not constitute a copyright violation. Finally, Part
IV provides a recap of the myths and underscores the dynamic interac-
tion between myths and the development of copyright law.
I. EVERYTHING ON THE INTERNET IS FREE (OF
COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS)
A pervasive and stubborn myth is that anything found on the Internet
is free-a whole new world to be exploited by those who subscribe to the
the music industry perspective, consumers and makers of consumer technology that en-
ables copying, could be viewed as an "axis of evil."
3. See, e.g., Steven Levy, The Customer Is Always Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2002,
at 65 (noting that the head of the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences,
Michael Greene, used the Grammy ceremonies as a soapbox against music downloading,
which he described as "the most insidious virus in our midst"). In addition, the vision of
the consumer as cyber-pirate has fostered increasing use of technological controls that at-
tempt to limit consumer use of content, with the much-maligned Hollings Bill as one of the
most extreme attempts. See, e.g., Security Systems Standards and Certification Act S. 2048
(2002) (mandating copy-protection technology in any content-providing device); Tony
Smith, May the Fraud Be With You, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2002 (discussing the actions taken
by Sony and other major media companies to technologically limit copying and thereby
minimize piracy).
4. For this essay, the term consumer will be used synonymously to mean copyright
user, as opposed to major copyright owners.
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idea of "finders-keepers." The idea seems to be that whatever is not
under virtual lock and key must be presumed free for the taking. In addi-
tion, this idea has developed into the major copyright myth that the entire
Internet is free of copyright restrictions.
The major misconception that copyright law is inapplicable to the In-
ternet is actually a mega-myth that includes several smaller myths. The
first myth is that information on the Internet cannot be protected by cop-
yright. The second myth addresses an appendix from the pure bricks and
mortar era; namely, that without a photocopier, there is no copyright lia-
bility. Finally, the third myth is that copyright liability is not an issue
unless a prominent copyright symbol is attached to the work in question.
A. MYTH 1: INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET CAN NOT
BE COPYRIGHTED
A frequent misconception is that copyright laws only apply to works
embodied in "tangible" objects, so that information appearing on a com-
puter screen is (erroneously) perceived to be free from copyright restric-
tions. This misconception has some basis in law, although the distortion
from copyright reality is a significant one. In particular, a copyright pro-
tects expressions of ideas that are "fixed" in some format from which
they may be perceived.5 However, the fixation need not be in an object
that is published by a book company or manufactured by a record com-
pany. Rather, the fixation is satisfied for statutory purposes if the expres-
sion is in any medium that may be humanly perceived. 6 Accordingly, any
expressive content that is found on the Internet would readily satisfy the
requirement of fixation.
Some of the mechanics of Internet access may further perpetuate the
myth that everything on the Internet is "free." Consumers are well aware
that while some material is not restricted on the Internet, various sites
require registration, and even subscription fees prior to access. The
tiered access to Internet sites suggests to consumers that access is re-
stricted only if a site requests money.7  In addition, the abundant exis-
tence of material that is not restricted by copyright laws probably fuels
further confusion. For example, many documents created by United
States agencies are made available through governmental websites for
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995) (tangible medium of expression).
6. See id.
7. This view could be fostered by the public perception of copyrights as primarily
methods of deriving compensation, rather than as an exclusive right and one of authorial
control. See, e.g., Celeste Katz, Bill Targets CD Pirates With Costly 1-2 Punch, DAILY
NEWS, June 17, 2001, at 13 (articulating the public perception that copyright protection
exists to provide money to its creator such that widespread copying of music results in
inappropriate monetary loss). Of course, the "public" perception referred to in this essay
is clearly the United States public; given the strong emphasis on moral rights of all authors
and creators in Europe, there is likely a more nuanced perception of copyrights abroad
than in the United States.
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free.8 However, less well known is that such access is freely available
only because there happens to be a provision in the Copyright Act that
specifically disqualifies works created by the federal government from
copyright protection.9 In addition, some websites further foster this myth
by providing copyrighted information for free as a means to attract a
solid customer base, although there is an intention of later charging cus-
tomers; indeed, this was Napster's original game plan that was abruptly
terminated while the service was still free. Some websites, such as those
that provide electronic greeting cards, continue to release copyright con-
tent free-of-charge (albeit with banner ads) to consumers.' 0
The myth that Internet information is free from copyright laws is also
supported by some studies in the psychology of human behavior. In par-
ticular, studies have shown that consumers try to abide by the law-as-
suming that they understand and believe the law to be reasonable.1' In
addition, because most consumers like to believe that they are law-abid-
ing, behavior they consider to be normal and reasonable is difficult to
internalize as illegal.12 Accordingly, otherwise law-abiding citizens regu-
larly disobey laws regarding speed limits, drug-use, and gambling. 13
Moreover, because laws are sometimes altered to fit the public norms, as
in the case of the increasing speed limit, the public perception that only
reasonable laws need to be followed is further reinforced. 14
Consumer notions of what is fair and reasonable similarly temper
8. See, e.g., Copyright Office, at http://www.loc.gov/copyright; U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office, at http://www.uspto.gov; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., www.fda.gov.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1995) (providing that works created by the United States Govern-
ment are ineligible for copyright protection).
10. See Hallmark e-greeting cards, at http://www.hallmark.com; Yahoo cards, at http://
www.yahoo.com. However, Blue Mountain, the first web-based e-card vendor, appears to
have implemented a version of Napster's original game plan by providing a two-tiered
access to e-cards; free e-cards continue to be available, but a more complete selection is
only available for an additional fee. See Blue Mountain Greeting Cards, at http://www.
bluemountain.com.
11. See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 226-29 (1997) (noting that studies show
people feel obligated to obey the law and primarily stray from the laws when the laws
diverge from public perception of what is fair).
12. Id. at 229-33.
13. Id. at 224-26; see also Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't
Just Say Yes to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 239 (1997) [hereinafter Copy-
right Noncompliance] (noting that citizens disregard laws they don't believe in, such as laws
against consensual sodomy and age limits on cigarettes); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and
Users in Copyright, 45 J. Copy. Soc'y 1 (1997).
14. Although the maximum speed limits were only recently lifted from 55 to 65 mph,
cars have been traveling at 65 mph and above for quite some time now. In addition, there
is actually some historical "precedent" for this logic in the history of copyright laws. The
Audio Home Recording Act was passed after Sony was decided to ensure that consumer
VCR users were not transformed into copyright infringers after taping their favorite televi-
sion shows for later viewing. See Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), 17 U.S.C. § 1001-
1010 (1992). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. Copy. Soc'y
1 (1997) (noting that the Sony decision was likely influenced by the fact that "the Supreme




awareness and understanding of copyright laws.15 Many aspects of copy-
right law may seem unreasonable to a typical consumer. Accordingly, it
may be challenging for consumers to internalize some of the Byzantine
nuances of copyright law. 16
B. MYTH 2: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT
A COPIER
Although we have evolved from a purely bricks and mortar world,
most consumers still carry traditional notions of copyright infringement
into the Internet context. In particular, the notion that impermissible
copies can only be made by a photocopier is a myth that pervades both
the use of information offline and on the Internet. The copyright owner's
right to duplicate her original work ("reproduction" right), however, is
not limited to copies made by a particular machine; any replication of the
original-whether by computer, hand, or copier-may still fall within the
official definition. 17 The cyber-equivalent of standing at a copier with an
original in hand is to print or download original music, images, and text
with a personal computer.
The mechanics of the Internet world can easily seduce users into imper-
missible copying. Unlike the bricks and mortar world where copyrighted
content, such as books and music, must typically be purchased in loca-
tions free of copying facilities, the very means of accessing the Internet
permits copying. There are millions of websites containing text, photo-
graphs, and music that may be easily "copied" without a cash register in
sight, or any other traditional indicia that payment should be expected.
Moreover, whereas public photocopiers frequently display warning signs
about copyright laws, there is no such warning provided to consumers
who boot up their computer or turn on their printer.
C. MYTH 3: IF THERE'S No COPYRIGHT SYMBOL, THERE'S
No PROBLEM
To further compound the confusion regarding what is copyrighted on
the Internet, there is a myth that no copyright exists without the copy of
the work bearing an explicit copyright symbol. However, copyrights exist
for contemporary creations (post-1976) even without a copyright sym-
15. See, e.g., Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 13, at 239-42; see also Tyler, supra
note 11, at 226-33.
16. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, U. Prrrs. L. REV. 235, 237 (1991)
(noting that copyright law is "tremendously counterintuitive" and difficult to grasp for
most laypeople because of its "mind-numbing collection of inconsistent, indeed incoherent
complexities").
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995) (providing that the copyright owner has the exclusive
right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" without specifying how the reproduc-
tion must be accomplished); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995) (providing definition of "cop-
ies" to mean "material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device").
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bol.18 CopyrighL protection actually exists from the moment material is
written or recorded, without any need for immediate registration. 19 Ac-
cordingly, a document found on the Internet without a copyright symbol
is not necessarily free for copying. Rather, copyright infringement re-
mains an issue even without the reminder of a copyright symbol.20
II. COPYRIGHTS SHOULDN'T "COUNT"
(VIGILANTE JUSTICE)
The second major myth of this essay is not exclusive to the Internet,
but has definitely been promoted by clashes between copyright owners
and users on the Internet. In particular, there is a strong myth that copy-
rights are solely utilized by corporations to increase their profits. Moreo-
ver, because consumers feel that corporations have failed to meet
consumer demand, consumers readily justify vigilante action.
A. MYTH: COPYRIGHTS ARE ALL OWNED BY CAPITALISTS
Many consumers feel increasingly justified that content-owners are the
truly evil ones. Consumers have reacted negatively to corporate cam-
paigns that portray consumers as evil pirates. In contrast, consumers be-
lieve that they themselves are not inherently evil and accordingly assume
that all their actions are justified.
A popular myth is that copyrights are only owned by profit-maximizing
capitalists. Most consumers conceive of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America (RIAA), as well as the individual major music labels, as
proto-typical examples. Based upon the assumption that all copyright
owners are inherently wealthy corporations, consumers readily assume
that copyright protection excessively provides monetary benefits to those
without need. In addition, a related theme is that copyright owners are
overly greedy and poorly attuned to the needs of consumers.2 1 Accord-
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a) (1995) (providing that a copyright notice "may" be
placed on copies of the work, but not requiring copyright notice on works created after
1976). However, although the 1976 Copyright Act eliminated the notice requirement, it
has only become a complete non-issue since 1989. See 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1995) (providing
that lack of copyright notice for works distributed prior to 1988 does not invalidate copy-
right if certain conditions are satisfied). In addition, for creations prior to 1976, a copyright
notice was one of the requirements to obtain copyright protection; publication without
notice would essentially forfeit copyright protection.
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1995) (noting that "copyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
20. In addition, Internet users need to beware not just of the invisible copyright sym-
bol, but the more visible, although perhaps less understandable contractual lingo regarding
copyright issues. Cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that CD-ROM
producer could enforce shrink-wrap license terms).
21. See, e.g., Brad King, Fans: Music Should Rock, Not Lock, WIRED NEWS, June 6,
2002, available at http://www.wired.com/news/print/o,1294,52895,00.html (noting that some
consumers are amenable to the concept of paying for music, but averse to the idea of
security systems (such as digital rights management) controlling how consumers listen to
music they have legally purchased).
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ingly, some believe that "robbing" copyright owners of royalties is a justi-
fiable transfer of wealth in a post-modern Robin Hood manner.
The issues attendant to Napster are a perfect illustration of this myth.
In particular, many consumers felt self-righteous in utilizing Napster's
services even after discovering that there were copyright violations impli-
cated because of the perception that record companies had failed to pro-
vide the type of service that they desired. Thus, in the face of perceived
inadequate services by copyright owners, consumers resorted to "self-ser-
vice" by blatantly ignoring copyrights and trying to download music from
Napster to beat the court-imposed preliminary injunction, which (to
users) clearly seemed unjust.
Admittedly, copyright cases reported in the press do tend to be prima-
rily cases waged by very wealthy plaintiffs.22 They are, after all, more
likely to be able to finance often lengthy and expensive litigation (as in
any field of litigation).23 However, copyrights may be-and are-owned
by individuals. 24 In fact, within the past decade, there have been some
notable decisions from the United States Supreme Court that have fa-
vored rights of individual creators. 25
In addition, even when individual copyright owners take on mega-cor-
porations such as Lexis and the New York Times, reports of such cases do
not dominate the headlines. For example, although the United States Su-
preme Court recently ruled that freelance authors retained the right to
22. For example, the Recording Industry Association of America, which represents
most of the record labels, has led the charge in many well-publicized cases against under-
dog opponents such as 2600 magazine, Napster, and Napster clones (such as Morpheus,
Kaaza, Aimster and Audiogalaxy). See, e.g., Brian Garrity, The World of Digital Music-
The Piracy War Wages on With New Emerging Strategies, BILLBOARD, July 13, 2002, at 71.
In addition, copyright infringement suits initiated by large corporations besides RIAA
have also been well reported in recent years. See, e.g., Sony v. Connectix, 203 F.3d 596 (9th
Cir. 2000); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Random
House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Castle Rock Entertainment,
Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.Com, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000). However, there is also another
trend within copyright litigation that emphasizes the rights of individual artists who main-
tain copyright ownership. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (noting cases that
emphasize rights of individual creators).
23. Interestingly, the perception of a David-Goliath balance in the copyright arena
may actually have helped finance more litigation in this area due to resources made availa-
ble to those seeking to protect public interest See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation,
http://www.eff.org/abouteff.html (noting it's mission to protect rights and needs associated
with new technology); Berkman Center for Internet & Society, http://www.cyber.law.
harvard.edu/projects/opencontent.html (noting the Berkman Center's effort to promote
the public availability of literature, art, music and film); Stanford Law School Center for
Internet and Society, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/dockets (noting representation of
individuals against larger corporations such as eBay and MGM).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1995) (providing that copyright ownership "vests initially
in the author or authors of the work"). However, copyrights can also be owned by employ-
ers who commission works under certain circumstances. See id. § 201(b); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1995) (defining a "work made for hire").
25. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); New
York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Last Ten Years in
U.S. Copyright: Overreaching or Reaching Out?, Fordam International Conference on In-
ternational Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Tenth Annual Conference, Apr. 4, 2002.
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additional royalties for the electronic compilation of their works in
databases, 26 this is a fact not widely known outside the field of intellec-
tual property lawyers. In addition, even though the legal holding under-
scored the rights of individual authors, the ramifications of the case
ironically have continued to perpetuate the myth that copyright owners
are capitalists. For example, the reaction of the defendant New York
Times was to presumptively remove all material in question from their
database, rather than to negotiate additional royalties with individual
authors.27
The myth that copyright owners are all capitalists also may persist be-
cause consumers have an incomplete picture of the creation and licensing
of copyrighted works. For example, songwriters often license their cre-
ations through centralized organizations that sell packages of performing
rights in songs to stores and radios.28 Accordingly, cases of small, inde-
pendent copyright owners who obtain revenue through the licensing of
their songs are not visible to the public. By contrast, newspaper head-
lines routinely trumpet the contracts of major recording stars that have
agreed to trade their copyright interest to a record company for guaran-
teed revenue, as well as marketing. In addition, although many perform-
ers who have contracted with record companies would likely agree that
the companies are all capitalists, the fact remains that this represents just
one situation of copyright ownership.
III. CONSUMER COPYING "DOESN'T COUNT"
The last major myth of this essay is also one of the most important ones
for both traditional contexts, as well as the Internet. The myth that con-
sumer copying does not constitute copyright infringement is actually a
mega myth comprised of three discrete myths that are more distinct: (1)
only commercial actors, such as corporations, can infringe copyrights, (2)
an intent to steal is required for copyright infringement, and (3) certain
types of "good" copies are always permissible. Each of these myths will
be addressed in turn.
A. MYTH 1: ONLY COMMERCIAL ACTORS CAN INFRINGE
COPYRIGHTS, NOT INDIVIDUALS
A corollary myth to the capitalist copyright owner myth is that only
commercial actors, not individuals, are liable for copyright infringement.
26. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487-88 (ruling on whether the right to revise under the Copy-
right Act included the electronic databases at issue here); see also Greenberg v. National
Geographic Soc., 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
27. See, e.g., John Greenwald, Cyber Payback: The High Court Upholds Freelancers'
Online Rights, TIME, July 9, 2001, at 38.
28. See, e.g., Janet L. Avery, The Struggle Over Performing Rights to Music: BMI and
ASCAP vs. Cable Television, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L. J. 47, 51 (1991); see also Carol
M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 617, 618 (2001) (describing similar function of Copyright Clearance Center with re-
spect to photocopying copyrighted material registered with the Center).
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Indeed, such a view would be reinforced by a casual observation of copy-
right suits reported in the popular press. For example, MP3.com, Nap-
ster, and Music City were all sued for copyright infringement, rather than
the consumers who used the services offered by these companies.29 Al-
though the myth that only corporations should be liable may foster a
sense of justice that resonates with consumers, it does not reflect the cur-
rent state of law.30
The fact that corporations are common targets of copyright infringe-
ment suits is more a reflection of tactical considerations in litigation,
rather than copyright law. Individuals are often direct infringers of copy-
rights, although typically they are not sued. Corporations, on the other
hand, are often at least indirect infringers. A plaintiff may elect to sue a
direct infringer, an indirect infringer, or all infringers. 31 However, corpo-
rations tend to be more readily identifiable than individuals; in addition,
litigating against corporations is seen as more efficient to stop large-scale
infringements, rather than suing each individual.32 For example, Napster
was sued for copyright infringement, rather than the millions of individ-
ual Napster users.33
However, this myth is beginning to be shattered. In addition to only
slightly veiled threats of litigation against consumers and proposals for
additional copyright-enhancing legislation, copyright actions against indi-
viduals are now entering the spotlight. Copyright owners have made it
clear that individuals are no longer immune, particularly when they vio-
late the new super-copyright provisions that forbid tampering with anti-
29. This example also illustrates the myth that good copies, including non-commercial
copies made by consumers, are always permissible. See infra note Part III.C.
30. See supra part II (discussing the myth that copyright owners are all capitalists, such
that consumers should be entitled to vigilante justice).
31. The copyright laws do not discriminate between corporations and individuals. See
17 U.S.C. § 501 (1995) ( "anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner ... is an infringer .... "). A copyright plaintiff may elect to sue the direct infringer
or the indirect infringers, much as a plaintiff in a negligence action can elect to sue one or
all joint tortfeasors.
32. Moreover, suing individuals may sometimes result in bad relations with the very
individuals who companies want as consumers buying copyrighted material. See, e.g., Ed-
ward A. Cavazos & G. Chin Chao, Computer Bulletin Board System Operator Liability for
the Infringement of their Users, 4 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 17 (1995); Steve Morse,
Burned? Last Year, Recordable Discs Outsold CDs for the First Time. With So Many Peo-
ple Copying Music, Is the Record Industry Toast?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2002, at L8
(quoting Hilary Rosen, head of RIAA as stating that the RIAA does not rule out suing
individuals, but considers that to be a measure of last result).
33. In that case, Napster was alleged to be liable for contributing to the many direct
infringements of Napster's users because Napster both provided the means to do so and
had full knowledge of the likely results. See A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd 239 F.3d 1004 (9 th Cir. 2001); see also UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., No. 00 CIV.472, 2000 U.S. Dist. WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2000); Zomba Recording Corp. v. MP3.Com, Inc., No. 00 CIV.6831, 2001 U.S. Dist.
WL 770926 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2001). In addition, there was also an allegation that Napster
was vicariously liable for the acts of its users because it was capable of stopping the in-
fringement, but failed to do so. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920-21.
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circumvention devices.34 For example, Princeton professor Edward
Felten was threatened with litigation when he wanted to present research
at a conference that disclosed problems with technology created by the
RIAA.35
In addition, criminal prosecution is now at stake for violation of some
copyright laws. For example, Russian scientist Dmitry Sklyarov was ar-
rested and subsequently criminally indicted for creating software that in-
tentionally works against anti-circumvention devices, even though this
was part of his job in a country outside the United States.36 In addition,
the Wall Street Journal recently reported that RIAA would now pursue
individual copyright infringement in addition to infringement of the
newer anti-circumvention provisions. 37 Ironically, the shattering of the
myth that only corporations are liable for copyright infringement may
further feed into the major myth that copyright owners are all capitalists,
which would further encourage consumers to believe in vigilante redis-
tributive justice.38
B. MYTH 2: IF I DON'T MEAN TO STEAL, I'M NOT GUILTY
A related myth to the idea that copyrights don't apply to consumer
copying is that without explicit intent to steal, no liability will be imposed.
This myth may have ironically become further entrenched as a result of
the evildoer rhetoric that attempts to re-educate consumers about how
copying can be evil. Consumers seem to have further fortified the origi-
nal myth that they are not liable for copyright violations without some
evil intent, rather than internalize the message that they are engaging in
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1992); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that publication of DVD anti-circumvention code,
known as "DeCSS code," to be impermissible under the amended copyright laws), affd
sub nom Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding web owners
liable under the amended copyright laws for posting links to websites that made decryption
software available).
35. See Letter from Matthew Oppenhiem, Vice President of the RIAA to Professor
Edward Felten (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/riaaletter.
html; Felten v. RIAA Complaint, dated June 6, 2001, at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
Felten_v_- RIAA/20010606_eff_complaint.html; see also Hiawatha Bray, Silly Law, Silly
Lawsuit, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 2001, at C1 (discussing Felten's participation in a contest
sponsored by the RIAA that eventually resulted in the litigation threat); Tinkerers' Cham-
pion, ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002 (describing Felten's experiences with the RIAA, as well as
his more recent activities against the DMCA); Steve Kettmann, Dutch Cryptographer Cries
Foul, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 15, 2001 (noting concerns of a Dutch cryptography expert in
publishing his findings regarding Intel's technological protection of digital video, based
upon the action taken against Prof. Felten).
36. See, e.g., Steven Levy, Busted by the Copyright Cops, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001;
Brenda Sandburg, Arrest May Trigger Copyright Fight, RECORDER, July 20, 2001.
37. Brad King, File Trading Furor Heats Up, WIRED, July 3, 2002, available at http://
www.wired.com/news (noting a news leak to the Wall Street Journal that the recording
industry would sue aggressive file-traders, although officials have since backed away from
this stance); see also Joy Russell Perez, Music Industry May Sue File-swappers, BOSTON
HERALD, July 4, 2002, at 18 (noting that top record label executives, as well as the RIAA
are contemplating law suits against individuals, rather than companies who assist in making
music free for downloading).
38. See supra Part I.
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evil activities. Intent to steal or profit from the works of others, however,
is not required for direct copyright infringement. 39 Rather, direct in-
fringement of the copyrighted work is established by showing (1) access
to the copyrighted work and (2) substantial similarity between the in-
fringing work and the original, copyrighted work.40 Accordingly, people
have been found liable for copyright infringement even when they were
not intending to misappropriate someone else's work. For example, one
of the most famous cases involved a finding that the late George Harri-
son's My Sweet Lord infringed the copyright of the popular song He's So
Fine, despite Harrison's assertion that he independently created the song.
The court was convinced that in light of the original work's popularity,
Harrison's defense was implausible. 41
Ironically, campaigns to re-educate consumers to understand that they
are engaging in mass piracy have not defused this myth.42 Rather, these
efforts further reinforce the myth that copyright owners are unjustified
and greedy evildoers. In addition, because consumers tend to believe
that they are generally law-abiding citizens, the allegation of bad acts
likely encourages further denial of any wrongdoing. 43 Also, the charac-
terizations of copyright infringers as criminals may further bolster the
myth that copyright liability only exists if there is criminal intent.
C. MYTH 3: COPIES FOR "GOOD" USES DON'T COUNT AS
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The myth that certain copies are for good uses and thus do not count as
copyright infringement is one of the most pervasive and persistent myths
surrounding the operation of copyrights on the Internet. The persistence
of the myth is likely attributable to the fact that it contains a grain of
truth. The copyright act provides many statutory exceptions from what
would otherwise constitute infringement. 44 In addition, there is a broadly
written exception for "fair use" that provides a complete defense to what
would otherwise be copyright infringement. 45 However, "fair use" is only
39. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (1995) (providing that "[a]nyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 121
or of the author as provided in section 106A ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of
the author").
40. § 501.
41. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisonsongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding the defense of independent creation unbelievable because of how
well-known the copyrighted original was).
42. See generally Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 13, at 244 -45 (criticizing a
prior proposal to re-educate consumers concerning copyright law); Morse, supra note 36,
at L8 (describing the results of Hilary Rosen's informal survey of her Harvard law student
audience in which only one third of students admitted to illegally downloading music, but
most admitted burning CDs for friends).
43. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
44. However, other parts of the copyright act do provide categorical exemptions, al-
beit in fairly narrow categories such as library archiving. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-22
(1995).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995) (noting that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of a copyright.").
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determined after weighing the statutory factors of (1) the creativity of the
copyrighted work, (2) a commercial use of the copyrighted work, (3)
amount of copying relative to the original, and (4) an adverse impact on
the market or value of the work.46 No single factor is dispositive of a
finding of fair use. Accordingly, there are no categorical per se exemp-
tions for what constitutes fair use.
Although there are no per se categories in reality, they are definitely
persistent myths. For example, the fair use factor of whether the copying
is for commercial use has developed into the myth that any non-commer-
cial use of copyrighted material fails to raise copyright infringement
problems. However, non-commercial use is not a determinative factor in
a fair use finding. In fact, some commercial uses have been found, on
balance, to be within the scope of fair use.47 In addition, the definition of
''commercial" in the context of fair use extends beyond the lay definition
of "commercial," to include activity that does not yield an immediate eco-
nomic benefit; accordingly, Napster was found to be engaging in commer-
cial use, with respect to the fair use factors even though it had not yet
charged subscribers for provision of content.4 8
Similarly, the counter-myth that all commercial uses constitute copy-
right infringement is an unfair blanket characterization. Although some
courts have stated that a presumption against a finding of fair use arises
when the use is for commercial purposes, the balancing of all fair use
factors is nonetheless required by statute.49 Indeed, courts ultimately
have found some commercial uses to be fair uses, including when there
have been substantial amounts of original material taken, based upon the
weighing of the other fair use factors.50
The prevailing myth about categorical types of activities that should
always be considered fair may persist because of an over-broad reading of
46. Id. (noting that in determining in a given case whether the use constitutes a fair
use, these factors shall be considered).
47. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding fair use despite appropriation of an entire advertisement where the copying
was done to rebut derogatory advertisement and defend the defendant's name).
48. A & M v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (expectation of revenue sufficient).
In addition, the repeated copying facilitated by Napster's web site was found to further
support a finding of commercial use. Id. at 913-14. Cf. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding defendant engaged in commercial use despite lack of
sales where the defendant had registered a domain name to extort the owner of the related
trademark). Of course, Napster's emphasis on the copyright owner's "right" as first en-
trant in a market was somewhat surprising with respect to prior law. See, e.g., Shubha
Ghosh, Turning Gray into Green: Some Comments on Napster, 23 HASTINGS. COMM. &
ENT. L. J. 563, 574-77 (2002)
49. See, e.g., NiMMER, 13 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 154-55 (noting that most courts do
in fact utilize all the fair use factors, although discussion is sometimes cursory). However,
the presumption against commercial use is not to be woodenly applied. See id.
50. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. University Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (hall-
mark case for the proposition that wholesale copying can nonetheless constitute fair use in
certain cases). In addition, this was a contentious issue in a recent case before the Elev-
enth Circuit in which the court rejected the argument that a novel providing a slave's per-
spective was an unauthorized sequel to the story Gone With the Wind. See Suntrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
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the fair use provision, in combination with the popular concept that fair
use is equivalent to what the public considers fair and reasonable. 51 For
example, although the fair use provision explicitly lists statutory factors to
balance, it also provides examples of what may constitute a fair use, in-
cluding use for teaching, scholarship and research. 52 However, as any as-
tute reader of the copyright statute realizes, these situations are only
intended to be proto-typical categories limited by the balancing test. Ac-
cordingly, only copying for teaching that meets the balancing test for fair
use will be justified, despite the myth that any use remotely related to
educational purpose should suffice for the fair use defense.
The legal nuances attendant to fair uses in teaching and research are
far more complex. Court precedents have banished simplistic assump-
tions, such as the mythic fair use assumption that all commercial use is
impermissible. On the other hand, some educational uses may nonethe-
less not be fair uses once the balancing test is applied. For example, the
copying of articles into course-packs for use in university classes has been
held to constitute impermissible copyright infringement. 53 Similarly, the
finding that a scientist who kept an archival copy of a research article for
personal use could be nonetheless infringing further supports the fact that
consumer perception of what is fair may not always predict how a court
will rule. 54
Similarly, fair use based upon a "limited" use of the copyrighted work
is also difficult to predict. For example, while there exists a myth that
anything short of wholesale copying is fair,55 the courts have not applied
fair use so woodenly. Courts, in fact, have found that copying of far less
than the entire work may be copyright infringement, if it constitutes the
"heart" of the work. 56 In addition, courts may come to differing results
regarding whether a "transformative" use of a copyrighted original con-
stitutes fair use. Although a myth exists that any transformative use is
per se fair under some mythical artistic license, case law has not created
such an exception.
51. See Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 17 (describing the current phenomena in the In-
ternet context where web creators unabashedly state that all material is used without au-
thorization and essentially imposing the burden upon the copyright owner to protest the
unauthorized use, contrary to legal presumptions, but ultimately noting that public percep-
tions have such a strong influence that they may be ultimately controlling).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
53. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(affirming liability for Michigan Document Services' impermissible copying of course
packs).
54. Am. Geophysical v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd., 60 F.3d 913 (2d
Cir. 1994).
55. The existence of this myth is also explained by the fact that consumers are loath to
consider many of the activities they ordinarily engage in to be in violation of the law.
56. Even small amounts of copying can exceed fair use if the "essence" of the original
work is taken. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (copy-
right infringement found where only 300 words out of 200,000 copied because these consti-
tuted the "heart" of the work).
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For example, some courts have found that a digitally manipulated copy
of a photo may constitute impermissible copyright infringement even if
the end product only contains a fraction of the original.57 Similarly,
"sampling" portions of existing music to use in new songs, as is commonly
done in rap music and other music genres, may also constitute impermis-
sible copying. 58 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a
thumbnail version of a copyrighted picture could be permissibly shown in
a search engine under the fair use doctrine. 59 Accordingly, the reality is
much more complex and unpredictable than the myth that all altered or
transferred works are free from copyright liability.
IV: REVISITING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN MYTH
AND REALITY
This section will revisit the issue of how myths can have a major influ-
ence on the evolution of copyright law. In particular, this section will
briefly outline how myths can impact the creation of new copyright laws,
as well as how the enforcement of copyright laws may impact the contin-
ued existence and power of myths.
A. THE MORPHING OF MYTHS INTO COPYRIGHT REALITY
The popular myth that copyrights do not exist on the Internet played
an important role in the rapid enactment of enhanced copyright laws
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the "DMCA"). While it is
true that international treaties impacted the enactment of these new laws,
the prevalent myth that consumers would fail to respect copyrights in
cyberspace likely played a more prominent role. For example, an extra-
polation of the myth that copyright infringement cannot exist without a
photocopier easily leads to a mind-boggling number of infringements by
almost every consumer who owns a personal computer, printer, or scan-
ner. Accordingly, the potential of infinite numbers of infringements con-
tributed to significant lobbying for the rapid enactment of the DMCA.
In addition, copyright owners' awareness of the many myths limiting
consumer perception of what copies "count" for infringement further
feeds into the philosophy of enhanced controls under the Copyright Act.
For example, the DMCA introduced super-copyright provisions that
make acts illegal that are well beyond the borders of traditional copyright
infringement. Unlike the traditional copyright provisions that governed
57. See, e.g., Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113
(D. Nev. 1999) (finding that scanning a photograph constitutes a copy even if the scanned
photograph is later manipulated and largely unused because the temporary copy consti-
tutes an infringement). However, this ruling is complicated by the fact that there were
actually two violations of the copyright owner's rights: the right to prevent copying (repro-
duction right), as well as the right to prepare derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995).
58. See, e.g., Grand Upright v. Warner Bros., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (begin-
ning the opinion by citing the bible [verse] "though shalt not steal," to further underscore
the inappropriateness of music sampling).
59. See Kelly v. Arriba, 280 F3d. 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
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unauthorized use of copyrighted originals, the super-copyright provisions
create liability for circumvention of technological devices that aim to pro-
tect copyrighted works.60 In other words, copyright owners were not con-
tent to rely on technological means to thwart consumer access; rather,
they created a new type of liability that extended beyond the traditional
concepts of copyright law.6 1 In addition, these new super-copyright pro-
visions provide their own exceptions that are narrowly drawn to make
previously permissible activity illegal. For example, even those engaged
in legitimate research to identify and analyze encryption systems must
first make a "good faith effort" to obtain actual authorization before pro-
ceeding to circumvent the normal technological means. 62
B. FUELING THE FIRE OF MYTHS BY ENFORCING SUPER-
COPYRIGHT RULES
The enactment of laws and new technology based upon existing myths
may have only fueled the fire behind the myths themselves. The anti-
circumvention provisions feed into the myth that all copyrights are owned
by capitalists trying to maximize returns for their copyrights. Similarly,
testimony and actions by the manufacturers of machines that limit copy-
ing similarly reinforce the myth that copyright owners primarily are
greedy corporations. Accordingly, consumers faced with ever-increasing
restrictions on their copying abilities will likely feel even more justified in
engaging in further acts of "self-service."
Moreover, highly publicized enforcement activities have further en-
hanced the power of certain myths. The litigation against Napster has
highlighted the discontent of many consumers with the major record
companies and reinforced the idea that consumers have the moral right to
ignore the unreasonable requests of capitalist copyright owners. Simi-
larly, high profile litigation against scientists like Professor Felten who
appear to be maligned for doing their job further enforce the myth of
capitalist copyright owners. Indeed, because the super-copyright provi-
sions that make activity beyond copying illegal seem so unreasonable to
consumers, consumers will likely have difficulty believing that these law
should exist, let alone be enforced.
60. For example, reverse engineering of technological devices is limited with respect to
the anti-circumvention provisions to situations involving the "sole purpose of identifying
and analyzing ... elements of the program ... necessary to achieve interoperability ....
and that have not previously been readily available." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1995); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circum-
vention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERK. TECH. L. J. 519 (1999). This limited
exception is particularly notable because it limits reverse engineering even in cases where
there is legitimate access to a computer program in general, albeit not a particular portion.
See § 1201(f).
61. See § 1201.




The themes of this essay should resonate with consumers and copyright
owners alike and help foster greater consideration of the importance of
myths, and the role they play in the creation of copyright laws. The brief
illustrations shown here should underscore the inevitable interplay be-
tween myths and reactionary copyright laws; the more power that myths
hold, the more copyright owners are likely to push for increasingly strin-
gent laws. However, this power struggle is unlikely to end with a final
determination of who is the ultimate evildoer.
This essay seeks to halt the blame game and instead, move toward con-
sensus building that will enable a productive inquiry into the source of
the problems that face both content owners and users on the information
super-highway. After all, the open issues surrounding many of these
myths will require either courts or Congress to determine the proper bal-
ance between these divergent groups. And, the closer these groups are
able to come to understanding each other, the closer they hopefully will
be to reaching a mutually agreeable (or, at least not an entirely disagreea-
ble) outcome.
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